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The Hoover-Bennett Meeting of 1931:
Mismanaged Summitry
Richard N. Kottman
The following article represents a dimension of a larger study-
Canadian policies during the Hoover Administration—to which Mr.
Kottman has devoted several years research, including considerable
time in the manuscript collections in the Herbert Hoover Presidential
Library at West Branch, Iowa.
DESPITE THE MILD ENTHUSIASM in Canada that greeted Herbert
Hoover's election as his country's thirty-first president, Canadian-
American relations were soon subjected to centrifugal strains.' The
first, and most serious, stress followed Hoover's decision to
implement his campaign pledge of greater tariff protection for the
American farmer. Higher duties on important Canadian agricultural
exports could only embarrass the Liberal government of Mackenzie
King, arouse the ire of Canadians of all political persuasions, and
afford the Conservatives an opportunity to capitalize on this public
sentiment in the next general election. Repeated warnings from the
United States legation in Ottawa, Canadian officials, and perceptive
American journalists deterred neither the President nor Congress
from a course that allegedly would reward an economic group
largely denied the benefits of "prosperity decade." Frustrated in
1929 when Congress in special session adjourned without passing
' I have discussed very briefly the Canadian reaction to the election of 1928
in "Hoover and Canada: Dipolmatic Appointments," Canadian Historical
Review, LI (September, 1970), 292-3. An excellent analysis of the impact of
this election in Canada can be found in the Times (London), November 1,
1928. See also the editorials in the Toronto Globe of October 16 and 24 and
November 2 and 7, 1928.
206 ANNALS OF IOWA
tariff legislation. Hoover finally affixed his signature to the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in June, 1930, confident that a reorga-
nized, bipartisan Tariff Commission, exercising the power given it in
the new law to recommend tariff changes to the President when
circumstances warranted, would placate foreign export interests
momentarily disenchanted with the revised (and perhaps excessive)
rates.'
What Liberals in the dominion had feared-and diplomats had
predicted-came to pass. Riding the rhetoric of their leader R. B.
Bennett who assured his countrymen that higher Canadian tariffs
would mean more effective bargaining with other commercial
powers, capitalizing on the contempt in which Canadians held
Smoot-Hawley, and exploiting several indiscreet campaign state-
ments of Mackenzie King, the Conservatives prevailed in the election
of July, 1930, and immediately set out to raise dominion schedules
higher than those of the Dunning Budget of May, the Liberals' retort
to congressional caprice. In September, at a special session shortened
by the Prime Minister's departure to London for an Imperial
Conference, Parliament revised upward selected, but important,
duties. Through modifications in the Customs Act, Parliament also
granted arbitrary powers to the minister of national revenue to
valorize imports for^ duty purposes. Worse, general tariff revision
with its threat to Anierican sales in Canada was scheduled for 1931.'
Shortly after his inauguration, too. Hoover reversed the lax
prohibition enforcement policies of his predecessors, requiring the
Department of State once again to press the King government to
embargo shipments of liquor from Canada to the United States. For
a year Ottawa resisted the pressure, believing that the importation of
' For some important citations dealing with the efforts before the passage of
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to dissuade Hoover and Congress from passing
tariff legislation, see Kottman, "Hoover and Canada: Diplomatic Appoint-
ments," CHR, LI , 294, n. 3. For the first direct Canadian plea-Sir Henry
Thornton, King's emissary to Washington in March, 1929, in private
conversation with Hoover—see memorandum, Thornton to King, March 16,
1929, Mackenzie King Papers, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, MG 26 ) I,
vol. 169. Hoover explained his decision to sign the Smoot-Hawley bill with its
emphasis on the tariff flexibility feature in The State Papers and Other Public
Writings of Herbert Hoover, Collected and edited by William Starr Myers, (2
Vols., Garden City, New York, 1934), 1,102-4, 318.
' For a very general account of these legislative actions, see The Canadiart
Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1930-31 (Toronto, 1931), 35-42, hereafter
cited as Canadian Annual Review.
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Canadian liquor had little effect on America's 'Vetness" or
"dryness" and that such a measure, besides costing the dominion
revenue and the taxpayer increased assessments, vk^ ould place on
Canada the onus for failure if, as officials assumed, the traffic
continued. Moreover, public opinion divided sharply on this issue of
Canadian cooperation in American prohibition enforcement, and
remained anxious about the tariff debate on Capitol Hill. Not until
January, 1930, did King decide definitely that international goodwill
dictated Parliamentary action, that a majority of Canadians now
agreed with this course, and that the Hoover Administration, as
reflected most recently in the establishment of a border patrol to
battle against smuggling, sincerely favored more rigid enforcement.
In March he personally introduced the desired legislation, and in late
May, just two weeks before Congress raised American tariff
schedules, the bill became law."
Despite the change in government, the law was not repealed,
although there were efforts in subsequent parliamentary sessions to
do so. Hanford MacNider, the American Minister in Canada,
dismissed such talk as little "more than a bluff on the part of
Members of Parliament in districts adversely affected by our new
immigration tactics."' Smuggling activities by Canadian rum runners
willing to risk an encounter with the United States Coast Guard
continued. On January 24, 1931, in action reminiscent of the I'm
Alone affair of April, 1929, the Coast Guard ended abruptly the
ventures of the previously elusive Josephine K., sinking the vessel
and fatally wounding its captain.' Since the circumstances of the
interception were marginal, the two governments had another
international incident to resolve.
The demands of organized labor in the United States, more
strident in late 1930 because of the Great Depression, precipitated
"For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Richard N. Kottman,
"Volstead Violated: Prohibition as a Factor in Canadian-American Relations,"
Canadian Historical Review, XLIII (June, 1962), 106-26.
'MacNider to James L. Wright, February 5, 1931, Hanford MacNider
Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
'Pertinent doucments relating to the sinking of the Josephine K. can be
found in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1932
(5 Vols., Washington, 1947), I I , 78-92. The latest scholarly treatment of the
I'm Atone incident is M. Paul Holsinger, "The 'I'm Alone' Controversy: A
Study in Inter-American Diplomacy, 1929-1936," Mid-America L (Oet
1968), 305-13.
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another issue, the American maneuver to restrict entry into the
country of commuting workers from Canada. That the dominion, as
acutely affected by the economic collapse as the United States, had
chosen not to take similar action against American commuters made
the issue that much more annoying.'
Canadian wheat growers and dealers, faced with surpluses
estimated at 250,000,000 bushels and no apparent market, had their
grievances. The purchase of wheat by the Grain Stabilization
Corporation with funds allocated to it by the Federal Farm Board in
Washington had raised slightly price levels in the United States. In
the absence of a comparable dominion agency; wheat prices in
Canada were abysmally low. As a result, the Prime Minister was
under pressure to find some way to alleviate this condition.'
From Washington's standpoint, the outstanding problem was the
refusal of Canada to proceed with the joint development of the St.
Lawrence River between Montreal and Lake Ontario. Hoover's pet
project since the mid-twenties when he chaired the St. Lawrence
River Commission, the seaway had been delayed for years by the
procrastinations of Mackenzie King and, more recently, by the
idiosyncrasies of R. B. Bennett who as prime minister established
a virtual one-man government in Ottawa, unwilling or unable to
delegate many responsibilities to subordinates. Hoover had expressly
commissioned Hanford MacNider to conclude a waterway treaty. By
January, 1931, he had nothing concrete to show for his efforts, only
the promise that Bennett would study the question upon his return
from the Imperial Conference.'
' For background to this issue, see Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1927 (3 Vols., Washington, 1942), I, 494-511; for
developments in late 1930 and 1931, see Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1931 (3 Vols., Washington, 1946), I, 894-8.
The problem is reviewed as well in Canadian Annual Review, 1930-31, 358-60.
'Christian Science Monitor, January 28 and 30, 1931. See also the
discussion of the wheat problem, particularly its Canadian overtones, in
Survey of International Affairs, 1930 (London, 1931), 477-81. Albert U.
Romasco discusses the American governments attempts to stabilize wheat
prices in The Poverty of Abundance (New York, 1965), 115-17.
'William R. Willoughby, The St, Lawrence Waterway: A Study in Politics
and Diplomacy (Madison, Wisconsin, 1961 ), 97-137. Bennett's proclivities for
one-man rule are developed in Kottman, "Hoo\/fer and Canada: Diplomatic
Appointments,", CHR, LI , 305-6. Sir William Clark, the British High
Commissioner in Ottawa, corroborated that Bennett expected "his ministers
to act merely in a secretariat or advisory capacity." During the parliamentary
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Against this backdrop of deteriorating relations, in late January,
1931, Bennett came to tbe American capital on an informal and
unofficial visit, during wbicb he met witb President Hoover and
several otber Wasbington officials. One might think tbat tbe meeting
of two men so similar in background and outlook would produce, if
not significant diplomatic breaktbrougbs, at least a friendship tbat
would provide the bilateral tie with a meaningful new dimension.
Bennett was a wealtby man wbo, like Hoover, traced bis good
fortune to bis own efforts and ability; like Hoover, be believed in
protection as a means by wbicb bis country could attain economic
greatness; like Hoover, be assigned to government a passive role in
tbe economy much preferring to see business function with a
minimum of regulation; and like Hoover, he did not take kindly to
criticism from tbe "fourtb estate." Nevertheless, the two heads of
state failed to effect any kind of warm and workable relationsbip.
Tbeir personal meeting contributed little, if anything, to a settle-
ment or an understanding of each otber and tbeir national
differences. It ended, moreover, on a sour note for both Bennett and
tbe American journalists wbo talked witb bim.
Tbis unsuccessful experiment in "summitry" or personal diplo-
macy suggests tbe limitations of tbis alternative to traditional
procedures, particularly if no preparations by the respective foreign
offices bave been made. Preparations were certainly lacking in tbis
instance. Apparently, Bennett bad not even divulged*to tbe Cabinet
wbat topics be expected to discuss witb tbe President.' " Neither tbe
files of tbe Department of State nor tbe records in tbe presidential
papers disclose any memorandum briefing Hoover on items tbat
mjgbt arise in his conversations witb tbe Prime Minister. However,
session of 1931 Bennett was "fully determined with unbounded self-confi-
dence to conduct a 'one-man government' in the full sense of the word.
Nothing is too great or too small for him to deal with personally." Clark
personally had seen "the enornnous volume of work with which Mr. Bennett
deals daily and . . . his refusal to delegate any of it either to other Ministers or
to a Secretariat of his own." William Clark, High Commissioner, to Dominion
Office, No. 67, April 8, 1931, British Foreign Records, Public Record Office,
London, File F. O. 627/ 34, document U339/127/750. To William R. Castle,
Jr., MacNider referred to the "very definite mission" given him by the
President. MacNider to Castle, October 14, 1930, MacNider Papers. The
Canadian note of September 10, 1930, promising study upon Bennett's return
from London is printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations ofthe
United States, 1930 (3 Vols., Washington, 1945), 1,533.
'"Toronto Globe, January 29, 1931.
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the decision to shroud in secrecy Bennett's several private talks-
with Hoover, secretaries Stimson, Lamont, and Wilbur and Eugene
Meyer, Jr., Governor of the Federal Reserve Board-encouraged
speculation about their importance, leading a Canadian journalist to
aver that the discussions "covered a wide territory and that events of
moment may be in the air."' ' When salutary expectations did not
materialize, relations deteriorated further. Hoover became annoyed,
feeling that his guest had not kept a promise to act promptly on his
St. Lawrence seaway proposal. Bennett disliked the press coverage
attending the visit, believing that it misled the public into thinking
that momentous conversations were being held.
The visit was mismanaged from^ the beginning. That the Prime
Minister even planned to go to Washington prompted members of
the press, in both Canada and the United States, zealously to
determine the "real" reason for the trip south. They refused to
accept at face value Bennett's public explanation that he had come
to inspect the Canadian legation and, as minister of External Affairs,
to meet Hume Wrong, the Canadian Chargé d'affaires, and his staff.
As David Rankin Barbee of the Washington Post expressed it, "that
he came to match wits with the best minds now in power in this
country; that he had a program of 'sore spots' to talk over is
apparent to any one who can see to the tip end of his nose . . . . " "
Embarrassingly, news of the imminent visit had become public in
Washington before Bennett's announcement in Ottawa, after "every
effort" had been made by State Department and legation officials
"to keep the plan secret, officials of both declining to comment
when a report regarding i t " circulated in the capital.' ' Hume Wrong
apologized to the Prime Minister, claiming to have done everything
possible to prevent it. " I think the leak must have come from the
White House," Wrong continued, "which is notoriously uncertain in
these matters."'* William R. Castle, Jr., assistant secretary of state,
thought differently. " I know as well as I can know anything without
documentary proof," he wrote MacNider, "that the Associated Press
"Ibid., February 2, 1931.
"Washington Post, February 1, 1931. See also the Associated Press
dispatches announcing the visit in the Chicago Tribune, January 24,1931, and
the Washington fosi, January 24,1931.
"Washington/'05Í, January 24,1931.
' * Wrong to Bennett, January 24, 1931, Richard B. Bennett Papers, Harriet
Irving Library, University of New Brunswick, Frederiction, voJ. 275.
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got that news from the Canadian press This matter of leaks to
the press has interested me for a long time, and l'hâve been trying
hard to get some line on i t . ' " ' Whatever the explanation. Wrong
noted that the curiosity of the press had been aroused, and that
particular attention would be paid to the White House meeting
between Bennett and Hoover if that fact became known "as I am
afraid it will be before you arrive." To limit the conjectures. Wrong
advised the Prime Minister to hold a press conference during the
visit.'* With nothing to guide them, newsmen speculated that the
two heads of government would focus on such questions as the
sinking of the Josephine K., the liquor problem in general, the
commuting annoyance, wheat surpluses, tariffs, and, most important
of all, the St. Lawrence waterway.' '
On January 30, 1931, the day of Bennett's arrival. Secretary of
State Henry L. Stimson found reporters at his regular press
conference to be "terribly excited" about what subjects he and the
Prime Minister planned to discuss. Despite their interest, however,
they "didn't get anything" from him. In the early afternoon Stimson
met his guest at Union Station, and drove him to Wrong's home.
Then and later that day the two men chatted pleasantly, Stimson
subsequently referring to Bennett as "a very likable fellow." Ever
mindful of the suspicions of the reporters, Stimson met with them
again shortly after the Prime Minister's visit to his office "to assure
them what he [Bennett] had not said." According to the Secretary,
none of the major questions had been mentioned.' » Bennett also
"Castle to MacNider, February 16, 1931. William R. Castle, Jr., Papers,
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, Box 2, claimed that
Canadian reporters got news that they were not allowed to use and, in turn,
gave it to their friends among the American press corps. The Canadians were
safe in conducting themselves in this manner because "no press man will ever
admit where he got any specific piece of information."
"Wrong to Bennett, January 24,1931, Bennett Papers, Vol. 275.
" T h e Christian Science Monitor, January 28 and 30, 1931, focused on the
twin issues of wheat and the waterway. A headline in its January 28 issue read,
"Bennett Visit to Hoover Thought to Have Much to do with Wheat Situation."
The gamut of Issues that would likely be discussed can be found in ttie
Washington Post, January 30, 1931, New York Times, January 30, 1931,
Chicago Tribune, January 24, 1931,.and Toronto Globe, February 2, 1931.
' Entry of January 30, 1931, Stimson Diary, Vol. 15, Henry L. Stimson
Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
Stimson's public disclaimer is reported in Chicago Tribune, January 31, 1931,
and the Boston Evening Transcript, January 31, 1931.
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talked briefly with President Hoover at the White House, after which
the latter declared that they had "no formal matters under
discussion." The two leaders were "mutually interested in the
common welfare of both nations," Hoover added, and doubtless
would have "some informal conversations on problems of the
future." ' '
That evening Bennett dined at the White House in the company
of Hoover, Stimson, Wrong, MacNider, Castle, and Major William
Herridge, a close friend and traveling companion of the Prime
Minister, who was soon to become the Canadian Minister to the
United States despite a disclaimer during Bennett's press conference.
Following dinner. Hoover and Benriett retired to a corner of the
library and talked "vigorously" for about ninety minutes. Later,
when his guests had departed, the President called the Secretary of
State aside, and informed him that they had discussed minor
irritants, including the latest American restriction on Canadian
commuters, before turning to a more important topic, the St.
Lawrence seaway, a topic Bennett was reluctant to discuss. When
they finally did, Bennett said that the political climate in Canada-
made more troublesome by Canadian-American "diff icult ies"-
prevented him from proceeding with any "treaty-making project."
As an alternative. Hoover suggested the creation of a commission-
with from three to five eminent persons from each country-not to
draft an accord but to discuss freely and critically the merits ofthe
concept. It would then publicize a proposed plan based on its
inquiry which would hopefully attract and crystallize opinion in
support of the seaway. Bennett, reluctant even on this point, refused
to commit himself, only agreeing to communicate with the State
Department in such language that the President could forward his
suggestion to Ottawa where "he would consider it favorable and do
his best for its acceptance."'" The item of paramount concern to
'»The newspapers already cited carried Hoover's press conference state-
ment in its entirety. The original is in the Hoover Papers, Press Conferences of
Herbert Clark Hoover, I-G/ 380, press conference of January 30,1931.
"En t r y of January 30, 1931, Stimson Diary, vol. 15; memorandum ot
conversation betv^een Marriner and MacNider, January 31,1931, DeP^rt";«"'
of State Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C., File No. 611.616/187.
Actually, Hoover gave tv^o versions of his conversation. To Stimson
immediately following Bennett's departure, he said that the Pr.me Minister
introduced the subject and "seemed to be much taken" with Hoover s
proposal. To MacNider, and I think this is the correct account, the President
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Bennett, however, was the Soviet Union's commercial threat to
Canadian wheat and lumber exports: The large-scale sale of these
commodities, an integral part of the grandiose Five Year Plan to
transform the Soviet economy into an industrialized giant, would
further depress the market. Quite naturally, Bennett wanted the
United States and the dominion to cooperate to "resist Russia on
this." The President responded tepidly, feeling that to be effective, a
multilateral effort was needed. The conversation ended with
Bennett's revealing several confidences allegedly implicating the
Soviets in the financial affairs of the last election campaign in Great
Britain.^'
The two men had not established any kind of warm, mutually
agreeable relationship. From Hoover's standpoint the test was
Canadian cooperation on the seaway. Here Bennett had agreed to
nothing concrete. Similarly, Bennett had gotten no satisfaction on
the question that irritated him. Other issues-wheat sales and
tariffs-had apparently not been discussed exhaustively.
Whereas the exchange between Hoover and Bennett had been
cordial, if not productive, other developments surrounding the visit
left a residue of bitterness in Ottawa and among American newsmen.
On January 31 Bennett met with a group of Canadian and American
journalists. His performance annoyed those present, leading an
Associated Press reporter to write, "Evading every question put to
him, the Premier concluded the conference . . . with a brief state-
ment of which he forbade publication The Premier gave no
direct answers to any of the questions . . . " ' ' He set the tone with
noted Bennett's reluctance to talk about the seaway at all as well as his
reluctance to commit himself on the commission proposal.
" Entry of January 30, 1931, Stimson Diary, Vol. 15. Fora brief treatment
of Soviet behavior and motivations, see Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of
Soviet Russia, 1929-1941 (2 Vols., London, 1963), I, 27-45. The most recent
and detailed account of economic friction between the Soviet Union and
Canada during the early thirties is Aloysius Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet
Relations Between the World Wars, (Toronto, 1972), 118-148. Unfortunately,
the dispatch from Sir Ronald Lindsay, the United Kingdom ambassador in
Washington, reporting a conversation with R. B. Bennett during the latter's
visit to the American capital is no longer in the files of the Foreign Office.
" r /7e Sunday Star (Washington), February î ; " l 9 3 1 , and the Washington
Post, February 1, 1931, published this controversial AP dispatch. The pertir
nent section is as follows: "The confusion and uncertainty which has sur-
rounded the v is i t . . . [of Bennett to Washington] deepened last night as he
prepared to return to Ottawa. A conference with newspapermen arranged to
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his response to the first question. "What about the St. Lawrence?"
asked a reporter, to which Bennett, smiling, replied, " I t is still
there." When pressed about the conversations with Hoover, the
Prime Minister testily remarked that " i t was his custom to
disremember after-dinner discussions."" One participant, James L.
Wright of the Buffalo (N.Y.) Evening News, wrote MacNider that
"the Prime Minister made a botch of his press conference, and left
anything but a happy impression" on those present. "We do not like
to have any man assume a patronizing air, tell us in a newspaper-boy
attitude that he knows we have to 'manufacture n e w s ' . . . " Wright
elaborated, "he invited questions and then ridiculed all that were
asked. It was an attempt at none-too-friendly wise-cracking. His
remarks were cynical. He could have said at the outset that he could
not discuss international questions, and that would have ended the
matter."'"
Speculation and rumors abounded, even after Bennett's return to
Ottawa. "The papers up here are very much upset because they have
been given no news about the expedition," the Minister revealed to
Wright, "and I have just spent a couple of hours tryingto fend off a
lot of newspapermen up here." MacNider concluded, " I only hope
they treat me kindly because 1 could give them no information and I
know they felt I had a lot." ' '
Whereas reporters reacted negatively to Bennett, the Prime
Minister had his own complaints. Within a month of his return,
relations between the Canadian government and the Associated Press
had become seriously strained because of the actions of one of the
syndicate's journalists. On the day of his departure from Washing-
ton, Bennett asked Hume Wrong to inform Frank B. Noyes,
give the premier an opportunity to taik frankly on the discussions he has had
with American officials, served only to add to the speculation over the visit.
Evading every question put to him, the premier concluded the conference with
newspapermen at the Canadian legation with a brief statement of which he
forbade publication. Questions relating to the proposed St. Lawrence
waterway, liquor, the Josephine K. incident, wheat, and finances were turned
aside by the premier with responses such as 'Now, that's an interesting point,'
and 'your question suggests something to me that I should look into.' The
premier gave no direct answers to any of the questions put to him by a group
of some 30 Canadian and American newspaper men about Canadian-American
problems . . . . "
"Toronto Globe, February 2,1931.
'*Wright to MacNider, February 3, 1931, MacNider Papers.
"MacNider to Wright, February 5, 1931, /ö/c/.
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president of the Associated Press and owner of the conservative
Washington Evening Star, of his displeasure with the way in which
his visit had been treated by the organization, a displeasure he
expressed again en route to New York from Washington.'* Unable
to convey Bennett's thoughts to Noyes orally. Wrong after a delay of
several days did so by letter. Shortly before Bennett's arrival in
Washington, Wrong with great care had briefed several newspaper-
men, including the AP reporter assigned to cover the visit, that the
Prime Minister had come to inspect the Canadian legation, but
expected to meet Hoover and Stimson. Once in the American
capital, however, Bennett "was surprised to find that not only were
his footsteps dogged wherever he w e n t . . . [by the reporter in
question] but that his frank statement on the purpose of his visit,
which he had repeated with emphasis at a press conference . . . was
treated with incredulity." Moreover, before the arrangements for
Bennett's visit had been concluded, the AP had learned of the Prime
Minister's imminent departure and had published this information in
spite of appeals from both the Department of State and the
Canadian legation to withhold the release until Bennett himself had
made the announcement.' '
undeniably the reporter pursued his duties diligently. During his
meeting with several journalists mentioned above. Wrong in some
detail had explained why they could not press him for information
about the Prime Minister's plans, particularly the scheduled social
engagements in Washington. When the Chargé arrived at the station
in Baltimore to meet Bennett, he saw the AP reporter who startled
him with the request that Wrong arrange for him.an interview with
the Prime Minister to be conducted while the Canadian party was
traveling from Baltimore to Washington. Wrong expressed doubts.
about Bennett's willingness to hold this type of interview, but agreed
to inform the Prime Minister that the gentleman was on the train. If
Bennett wanted to go on from there. Wrong promised to contact
him. The reporter subsequently entered the Prime Minister's car
uninvited. Even this "unjustifiable intrusion" was not all. He had
talked on the telephone with one of the legation staff, "threatening"
to "follow Mr. Bennett wherever he went unless the legation would
furnish him with details of his programme." When it refused, the
"Wrong to Bennett, February 21,1931, Bennett Papers, Vol. 275.
' ' Wrong to Noyes, February 5^  1931, ibid.
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persistent reporter carried out the threat, and, in Wrong's words,
"followed Mr. Bennett's car whenever he left the legation, and stood
outside the building at night until the lights were extinguished."
That "no other journalist thought it necessary to adopt these
devices" underscored for the Canadians the "legitimate cause of
irritation."^«
Distorted reporting also drew fire. As Wrong wrote Noyes in his
initial letter, "every AP report which I have seen was filled with
rumours of mysterious and quite non-existent negotiations which
were alleged to have taken place."^' The Charge conceded AP
dispatches were no more misleading than some, and less so than
others. Not surprisingly, they were very complete in chronicling
details of Bennett's movements. Nevertheless, the reporter's sugges-
tion that important negotiations were going on embarrassed the
government, and prompted other journalists to question the Prime
Minister's stated reason for coming to Washington.' "
The Canadian complaints to the president of the AP provoked
developments perhaps novel in the history of Canadian-American
relations. Frank B. Noyes immediately turned Wrong's letter over to
Kent Cooper, the syndicate's general manager, who took the
offensive. He noted that because of Bennett's "singular aversion to
the press," his organization had "reduced its news coverage of his
visit to the lowest point compatible with its obligation to every daily
newspaper published in Canada and 1300 newspapers in the United
States." He denied that statements in AP dispatches were misleading;
in fact he argued that "every statement... [was] confirmable by
reliable authority." Disputing Wrong's allegation that the AP
reporter treated Bennett's comments with "incredulity," Cooper
described as perplexed his own reaction to the Prime Minister's
remarks, particularly his denial of discussions of consequence with
American officials when Hoover had referred to "informal conversa-
tions on problems of the future." Moreover, Cooper failed to see any
breach of professional ethics in any of the actions, but admitted that
he and Wrong disagreed on the point. He emphasized that Wrong's
complaint was unique in a career that had spanned thirty years, but
"Wrong to Noyes, draft letter, March 2,1931, /Wrf. The letter in this form
was never sent.
"Wrong to Noyes, February 5, ^93^,ibid.
"Wrong to Noyes, draft letter, March 2, 1931,/Wrf.
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promised, nevertheless, to forward Wrong's letter, and any additional
correspondence the Charge chose to send, to the board of directors
of the Associated Press.' '
. Wrong's reply was prompt and succinct. The Chargé stated that
he did not want to become involved in an epistolary exchange, and
suggested that the two men discuss the question during Cooper's
next trip to Washington. Noyes himself then kept the incident alive
with a most intemperate letter to Wrong. Reporting this latest
wrinkle to the Prime Minister, the Chargé admitted that Noyes'
letter had "got very much under my skin, and I am probably taking
it too seriously." The thought that " i t is probably to the advantage
of the Prime Minister of Canada to have a critical press in the United
States" consoled him. It left, however, "a very nasty taste in my
mouth . . .and I think that I was probably over-zealous in carrying
out your instructions."''
By early March, Wrong had drafted a long letter to Noyes
spelling out the main charges against the AP reporter and refuting
Noyes' own "insulting" attempt to defend the organization.' '
Before mailing it, however, the Chargé decided to solicit the advice
of a friend. Sir Willmott Lewis, the Washington correspondent of the
Times (London). Lewis, Noyes' son-in-law, reportedly had consider-
able influence with the AP executive. Wrong was particularly
interested in whether Noyes might publish his scathing note to the
Chargé. Initially reluctant to be drawn into the dispute, Lewis
changed his mind after Wrong read him Noyes' letter. He promised
to see Noyes at his first opportunity to try to compose the
difficulty. It was obvious to Lewis that his father-in-law had drafted
the letter "when in a furious temper." He doubted that the letter
would be made public, even though the complaints would have to be
reviewed by the board of directors of the AP. In any case, Lewis
stated that Noyes had recently mellowed, but still believed that the
AP dispatches were at least on a par with others, and in some cases
had spiked rumors that were gaining currency, a point Wrong was
willing to concede. A second bone "sticking in Noyes' throat" was
an alleged threat made by Wrong to the AP reporter that the.
31 I
'Noyes to Wrong, February 7, 1931 ¡Cooper to Wrong, February 9 1931
ibid.
"Wrong to Bennett, February 21, 1931; Noyes to Wrong, February 17
^S'i^,ibid. '
3 3 Wrong to Noyes, draft letter, March 2, 1931, ibid.
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Canadian legation would henceforth discriminate against the syndi-
cate.
His two meetings with Lewis convinced Wrong to withhold his
sharply worded rebuke of Noyes. A narration of events, as originally
conceived, "would only provoke a long reply in k ind." '* On March
12 the Charge' sent Noyes a more carefully phrased reply. He
absolved Bennett of any responsibility for the language used to
express the Prime Minister's complaints. The Charge denied any
intention on his or Bennett's part "to make any attack on the
Associated Press as an organization," while admitting that his letter
"seems to have conveyed that impression and also the impression
that I believed that the dispatches of the Associated Press were
particularly misleading." Wrong conceded that the dispatches in
question were no worse, and in some respects better, than those of
other journalists. His major grievance remained the activities of one
reporter "whose zeal . . . outran his discretion." Wrong explained
that several days after Bennett's departure from Washington he
reported to the journalist the substance of Bennett's complaint.
When so advised, the reporter defended his actions, adding that he
"should have pursued the same methods further." At that point
Wrong declared that in the future he "should feel justified in seeking
to place obstacles in his way." That statement was not to be
construed as a blanket threat against the AP for, as Wrong wrote, "I
shall be happy to co-operate with the Associated Press in the future
as in the past." Whereas the tone throughout had been conciliatory,
the Charge concluded, "some of the observations made in your letter
you must permit me to pass over without comment or reply."' '
Noyes still would not let the affair die. He asked Wrong if, after
reading the full text of the AP report of the Bennett visit, the Charge
still felt justified in his allegation that it was "full of rumors of
non-existent negotiations" and a distortion of what had tran-
spried.=" Wrong answered that his "language was too general," but
argued that news stories alone would not have prompted the
complaint. He still took exception to several parts of the AP
dispatch of January 31, reiterating that Bennett came to visit the
'*Wrong to Bennett, March 2, 1931; Wrong to Bennett, March 13, 1931,
ibid,
' ' Wrong to Noyes, March 12,1931, ibid,
'"Noyes to Wrong, March 19,1931,ibid.
Hoover-Bennett Meeting 2] 9
Canadian legation prior to his appointment of a minister to the
United States and that the conversations between Hoover and
Bennett were too general to be the subject of a press com-
munique.''
Noyes immediately interpreted Wrong's latest statements as "a
withdrawal of your previous indictment ofthe integrity ofthe news
reports of the- Associated Press." He advised further that unless he
heard otherwise from the Charge, he would so inform the board of
directors.'' In a draft letter Wrong answered the arguments
advanced by Noyes to resolve the outstanding "minor points"-such
as the ethics of the AP release of the impending visit before official
notice was made in Ottawa—but he never sent it. Noyes' interpreta-
tion was allowed to stand.
On April 1 Wrong forwarded his draft to Bennett, noting that
the Prime Minister could terminate the controversy by accepting
Noyes' comments as the final word, prolong it by sending Noyes
the enclosure in which Wrong had documented that the AP
correspondent had lied on one specific occasion, or become involved
himself by personally writing Noyes. Wrong saw no pressing need for
the third course, since he had "succeeded fairly well in focusing
on . . [himself] the resentment which the matter had aroused in the
minds of Mr. Noyes and his colleagues, and . . . they now regard me
and not you as the villain in the piece."'» That rationale,
strengthened by the assurances of Sir Willmott Lewis that the
episode would receive no publicity and Noyes considered the
incident closed, probably explains the decision to let the matter rest.
Beyond this intriguing glimpse of the ethics and maneuvers of
the journalism profession remains the inability of Bennett and
Hoover to improve relations through personal diplomacy. The visit
was not a grand success. Their impressions of each other are
unknown. That they never met again—and did not even correspond
-perhaps says something. Bennett left Washington with some
resentment at the treatment accorded him by the press and with no
satisfaction regarding his efforts for Canadian wheat growers. Hoover
wanted action from the Prime Minister on the St. Lawrence
waterway question; none was immediately forthcoming. Personal
' 'Wrong to Noyes, March 26, 1931, ibid.
' ' Noyes to Wrong, March 30,1931, ibid.
"Wrong to Bennett, April 1, 1931, with enclosure, draft letter Wrong to
Noyes, March 31, 1931,/ô/rf.
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diplomacy had failed to change the direction in which Canadian-
American relations had been heading for the past two years. Higher
Canadian tariffs and the Anglo-Canadian trade agreement of 1932,
negotiated at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa
with the intention of diverting commerce from American to imperial
channels, lay ahead to the consternation of American business.
Dominion exporters of lumber and copper felt significantly the
impact of the Revenue Act of 1932 when Congress, manifesting a
commitment to the sanctity of balanced budgets, imposed excise
taxes, in addition to the pertaining tariff rates, on these two
products.
On February 6, a few days after Bennett's return to Ottawa,
stories appeared in the press that one result of the meeting in
Washington was the imminent appointment of a preliminary
commission to expedite completion of the St. Lawrence waterway
negotiations.*" Such reports proved to be erroneous. Not until
November, 1931, were negotiations begun, and then by State
Department personnel and William Herridge rather than by ad hoc
commissioners. Not until July, 1932, was a seaway treaty perfected,
much too late to alter Hoover's image in Canada or to dissuade
Conservatives frorii their apparent preference for a victory by the
Democrats in the presidential election.
Given the timing of Bennett's trip to Washington-shortly before
the opening of an important session of Parliartient—* ' the recent
deterioration in Canadian-American relations with numerous ques-
tions still unresolved, and the prominent individuals who had
audiences with Bennett, it is understandable why reporters felt there
was more to the visit than they had been told. Their efforts to
discover this greater meaning—or the tendency to let their specula-
tive faculties run riot—created problems for the participants, and
'"Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1931; New York Times, February
6,1931.
*'Toronto Globe, January 29, 1931, published dispatch by a staff
correspondent. It stated that Mackenzie King had issued a statement
complaining about Bennett's failure to summon Parliament to deal with the
nation's economic ills. He chided him about the trip to Washington just at that
time, and posed rhetorically, " I wonder what would have been said if, before
meeting Parliament at a time of serious economic distress, I had, while in
office, found it necessary to go to Washington for an interview with the
President of the United States, or, indeed, for any other reason." King's
statement may be found also in Canadian Annual Review, 1930-31, 31.
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aroused the expectations of informed citizens in both countries.
Meetings between heads of state, formal or informal, carry the risk
that the leaders cannot properly and successfully negotiate or
exchange views in this public setting. When they leave such talks
empty-handed, there follows the inevitable disappointment, if not
disillusionment. The technique can only succeed when the foreign
offices have composed the various problems and have ready for
ratification, by their heads of state, agreements on these outstanding
issues. Inadequately planned summit meetings—such as the Bennett-
Hoover meeting of 1931—can easily be mismanaged or misconstrued.
At best they do little good; they can do great harm. The ultimate
verdict of the Bennett-Hoover summit is mildly negative—no
disastrous consequesces but no significant improvement in relations.
It remains an excellent example of how not to arrange and to
conduct such a meeting.
The Sioux of the Rosebud Photographs by John A. Anderson, Text
by Henry W. Hamilton and Jean Tyree Hamilton (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), pp. XXXI, 320, index.
$12.50
THIS IS A HISTORY in pictures of the Brûlé Sioux Indians on the
Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota. The book presents photo-
graphs taken by John A. Anderson, a Swedish-born settler who
migrated west to Fort Niobrara, Nebraska in 1883. Anderson's
interest and proficiency in photography led to his being invited by
the U.S. army to serve as official photographer to the Crook Treaty
Commission's visit to the Brûlé Sioux Indians on the Rosebud
Reservation in South Dakota. From 1891 until his death in 1948,
Anderson lived on the Rosebud and recorded the painful adjustment
of the proud Brûlés to life on the reservation.
The text by Henry W. and Jean Tyree Hamilton offers
explanation and documentation of the persons, places and events in
Anderson's photos. Also included is a brief biography of Anderson
and a brief account of the Brûlé Sioux.

